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Abstract: This paper empirically investigates whether individuals indeed vote with their pocketbooks. 
Individual level data from the General Social Survey and the World Values Survey show significant 
deviations from pocketbook voting even among the poorest and the richest individuals in the sample. 
Differences in income status, education status, and perceived social mobility explain only a small fraction 
of the cross-country variation in the preference for income equality.  Economically large and statistically 
significant country effects remain.  There is no evidence that the median preference for income equality is 
more intense when incomes are more unequal or when the regimes are more democratic, a finding that 
rules out redistributive pressure as an important mechanism through which inequality affects growth 
under majority rule. 
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This paper investigates whether individuals indeed vote with their pocketbooks. The assumption
of pocketbook voting underlies most, if not all, political economy models. The conclusions of these
models typically depend sensitively on this assumption. Thus, it is important for this assumption
to be reasonably realistic, otherwise the results are suspect. To investigate the validity of this
assumption, I propose two tests based on survey responses to a specic question related to the
preference for income equality. Both tests reveal that deviations from pocketbook voting are indeed
too large for this assumption to be realistic, and for the models based crucially on it to yield accurate
predictions.
The rst test is at the individual level. Since the poor gain and the rich lose if incomes were
made more equal, if individuals vote with their pocketbooks, then the poor would support greater
income equality, while the rich would oppose them. For example, Romer (1975) shows that when
income taxes are proportional and transfers are lump sum, anybody with income above the mean
would vote for a zero tax rate, whereas everyone with income below the mean would favor a higher
marginal tax rate. Thus, an examination of how accurate an individual's income status predicts
his preference for more income equality is a test for the validity of the assumption of pocketbook
voting.1
Second, since the median income is further below the average income in more unequal societies,
the median voters in these societies have more to gain from government policies which make incomes
more equal. Thus, if individuals do vote with their pocketbooks, the median preference for income
equality should be more intense when incomes are more unequal. Thus, an examination of how
accurate income inequality predicts the median preference for income equality yields another test
1Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) argue that it is important to control for social mobility when examining this
relationship if redistribution policies do not change often, as forward looking individuals may regard social mobility
and redistribution as alternatives in maximizing their lifetime utility.
2for the validity of pocketbook voting at the macroeconomic level. The result from this test bears
directly on the Median Voter Theorem.
To illustrate the importance of the assumption of pocketbook voting, consider, for example,
the models of inequality and growth by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik
(1994). Their models assume that individuals vote with their pocketbooks. As I pointed out
earlier, under this assumption, the median preference for income equality and redistribution should
be greater in more unequal societies. Therefore, the Median Voter Theorem implies that, under
the majority rule, these societies would adopt a higher tax rate. A higher tax rate would in
turn lead to greater distortion of economic incentives and less accumulation. Furthermore, since
democratization typically involves enfranchisement of the poor and the disadvantaged, if people do
vote with their pocketbooks, the pressure to redistribute would be greater under the democratic
regimes.2 However, if a sucient number of people deviate from pocketbook voting, then the
mechanisms postulated by these models would fail.
Indeed, these political economy models typically do not perform very well empirically; there is
some evidence that higher inequality is not associated with more government transfers and redis-
tribution.3 To understand this nding, I try to answer two questions: rst, is pocketbook voting a
good approximation at the individual level? Second, if there are deviations from pocketbook voting
at the individual level, is there still a reduced form relationship between inequality and redistribu-
tive preference at the aggregate level? It turns out that deviations from pocketbook voting are
indeed so large and so prevalent that higher inequality is not necessarily associated with greater
preference for income equality.
In examining self-reported preference for income equality, it is important that the survey ques-
tions explicitly incorporate the costs involved in making incomes more equal; otherwise, one may
2See, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
3See Perotti (1996).
3express a preference that, so to speak, allows him to have the cake and eat it too. Certainly, as
it is with other preferences, the preference for income equality is only meaningful if it is backed
by the willingness to pay. In principle, greater income equality can be achieved only if the soci-
ety is willing to tolerate a loss in economic eciency. This tradeo between income equality and
economic eciency arises because incomes can be made more equal only through some forms of
government intervention, such as government taxation and transfers. These government interven-
tions inevitably create distortions in the economy, by driving a wedge between the true economic
incentives and the actual incentives facing the economic agents, thus resulting in deadweight losses.
I shall argue that the specic survey questions used here are designed such that this tradeo is
explicitly incorporated.4
U s i n gd a t af r o mt h eGeneral Social Survey and the World Values Survey, signicant devia-
tions from pocketbook voting are found at the individual level, across all income classes and in all
countries. More importantly, income variables only explain a small fraction of the cross-country
dierences in the preference for income equality. Economically large and statistically signicant
country xed eects remain even after taking into account characteristics such as income, educa-
tional status, and perceived social mobility. While the Median Voter Theorem may still apply given
these deviations from pocketbook voting, the median voter for issues on income equality is not the
median agent in the income distribution, as there is no longer a monotonic relationship between
one's income position and his preference for income equality. Instead, I directly identify the median
preference for income equality for each country under dierent voter turnout assumptions. There
is no evidence that the median preference for income equality is associated with existing inequality.
4However, it is not necessary for the respondent to be conscious of the exact tradeo involved. What is required
is that he cannot express a preference that is not backed by the willingness to pay, because of the way the survey
question is designed. Thus, the respondent need not be aware of the tradeo between income equality and economic
eciency, that he is making a choice between the two. Nevertheless, it is important that he cannot choose high
economic eciency and high income equality at the same time.
4Thus, there is no evidence that supports the particular mechanism linking inequality to growth
posited by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Finally, there is also no
evidence that the median preference for income equality is more pronounced in democracies.
This paper is related to Alesina and La Ferrara(2001)and Corneo and Gr¨ uner (2000), who study
individual preference for redistribution in the United States and in twelve countries respectively.
Both studies stress that factors other than current income are important in determining individual
preference for redistribution. Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) argue that since social mobility makes
some of today's poor into tomorrow's rich, if redistribution policies do not change often, then
greater prospect for social mobility should weaken the support for redistribution for forward looking
individuals, especially when the mobility process is perceived to be fair. Similarly, Corneo and
Gr¨ uner (2000) nd that the desire to act in accordance with public values and the desire to obtain
high social standing are at least as important as an individual's income position in explaining the
observed international dierences in the preference for redistribution. Furthermore, they show that
xed country eects are what explain most of the cross-country dierences in attitudes towards
redistribution. They also claim that the former socialist countries tend to have stronger preference
for income equality.
However, neither Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) nor Corneo and Gr¨ uner examine the impli-
cations of these deviations on making inferences under the Median Voter Theorem. This paper
attempts to ll this gap. This paper also diers from Corneo and Gr¨ uner (2000) in that the specic
survey question I use explicitly incorporates the tradeo between equality and eciency. I show
that once the tradeo between income equality and economic eciency is explicitly taken into
consideration, most former socialist countries tend to have lower, not higher, preference for income
equality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the surveys and the data.
5Section 3 contains the empirical analyses. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Data on Individual Preference for Income Equality
2.1 General Social Survey
The General Social Survey is an almost annual \omnibus" personal interview survey of U.S. house-
holds conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. I use the response to a specic question
regarding whether the government should reduce income dierences to measure the preference for
income equality. This question is worded as follows:
Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income
dierences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy
families or by giving income assitance to the poor. Others think that the government
should not concern itself with reducing this income dierence between the rich and the
poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that
the government ought to reduce the income dierences between rich and poor, and a
score of 7 meaning that the goverment should not concern itself with reducing income
dierences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?
Note that this question informs the respondent the tradeo involved in reducing income dier-
ences between the rich and the poor. I denote the preference for income equality by EQUAL,s ot h a t
higher scores indicate greater preference for income equality.5 Following Alesina and La Ferrara
(2001), I dene a dummy variable GOVRED to indicate support for government redistribution.6
5Thus, if the response to the previous question is denoted by EQWLTH,t h e nEQUAL = 8 - EQWLTH.T h e
G e n e r a lS o c i a lS u r v e yalso contains another question on income equality in selected years. It is included and treated
as the same as the previous question. The alternative question is worded as follows:
Some people think that the income dierences between the rich and the poor ought to be reduced,
perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others
think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income dierence between the
rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the
government ought to reduce the income dierences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning
that the government should not concern itself with reduceing income dierences. What score between
1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?
6GOVRED equals one if 5  EQUAL  7.
62.2 World Values Survey
The World Values Survey is a survey on human values on a wide-ranging issues. It was conducted
around 1990. It covers about forty countries, including most OECD countries. The principal
investigator is typically the Gallup organization, the local university, or the local research institute.
To survey the preference for income equality, the respondents are asked to indicate his preference
by an integer on a scale of 1 to 10, where a score of 1 means that \incomes should be made
more equal," and a score of 10 means that \there should be greater incentives for individual
eort." I denote the preference for income equality by EQUAL, so that higher scores indicate
greater preference for income equality.7 Note that the response to this question incorporates the
respondents' implicit willingness to pay for greater income equality because if they choose greater
income equality, they would not be able to choose more private incentives or economic eciency at
t h es a m et i m e .Ia l s oc r e a t ead u m m yv a r i a b l eEQUALDUM to indicate the preference for income
equality.8
There are two questions related to perceived social mobility. First, the respondents are asked
to indicate his preference by an integer on a scale of 1 to 10, where a score of 1 means that \in the
long run, hard work usually brings a better life," and a score of 10 means that \hard work doesn't
generally bring success { it's more a matter of luck and connections." I denote the rst variable
for perceived social mobility by Hard Work Pays, so that higher scores indicate stronger belief that
hard work does pay o.9 In the second question, the respondent is asked the following:
Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other
people feel that what they do has no real eect on what happens to them. Please use
the scale (any integer from 1 to 10) to indicate how much freedom of choice and control
you feel you have over the way your life turns out, where a score of 1 indicates \none
at all," and a score of 10 means \a great deal."
7Thus, if the response to the previous question is denoted as V250,t h e nEQUAL = 11 - V250.
8EQUALDUM equals one if 6  EQUAL  10, and zero otherwise.
9Thus, if the response to the previous question is denoted by V255,t h e nHard Work Pays = 11 - V255.
7I denote the second variable for perceived social mobility by Control over Life; a higher score
indicates stronger belief that one has control over how his life turns out.
3 Empirical Analyses
I begin by using the survey data to characterize deviations from pocketbook voting. I then in-
vestigate how much of the cross-country variation in the preference for income equality can be
explained by income status and perceived social mobility. It turns out that large and statistically
signicant country eects remain even after taking into account factors such as income status, ed-
ucational attainment, and perceived social mobility. Finally, I identify the median preference for
income equality for each country, and estimate the reduced form relationship between the median
preference and existing inequality.
3.1 Characterizing Deviations from Pocketbook Voting
Table 1 shows the distribution of the preference for income equality in the United States for the year
1978 by detailed income classes. The average income in 1978 is $9,451. Clearly, one's position in the
income distribution cannot fully explain one's preference for redistribution. Moreover, substantial
deviations from pocketbook voting can be found in the tails of the income distribution. About one
third of the sample with income less than $1,000 is not inclined to support government reduction of
income dierences; they have a preference range of 1 { 3. Similarly, about one third of the sample
with income greater than $25,000 is inclined to support government redistribution to reduce income
inequality; they have a preference range of 4 { 7.
Such deviations at the tails of the income distribution cannot be attributed to uncertainty
about one's position in the income distribution because, given that the true average income is
$9,451, attributing these deviations to uncertainty would imply an unreasonably large error in
8predicting the average income. These deviations also rule out social mobility as the explanation
because social mobility is a poor substitute for government redistribution for people in the tails of
the income distribution: Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) show that social mobility is extremely low
for these people.10
Figure 1 plots the proportion of respondents with GOVRED equal to one by detailed income
classes in the year 1978. Pocketbook voting implies that everybody with income less than average
will prefer government redistribution, while anyone with income above average will be against
government redistribution. However, in contrast to the prediction of pocketbook voting, the pattern
in Figure 1 is much smoother.
Similarly, Table 2 characterizes the preference for income equality by income classes for all the
OECD countries included in the World Values Survey. A few caveats concerning the income variable
should be made. First, the income variable refers to household income, rather than personal income
of the respondent. Second, the income variable is categorical. It ranges from one to ten, from low
to high, for most countries. However, the exact income thresholds separating one category from the
next are unclear in the documentation of the survey. To make the income variable more comparable
across countries, the sample for each country is sorted and re-classied into three income groups {
lower, middle, and upper income groups { such that each group contains approximately one third
of the sample. Table 2 reveals that there are signicant dierences among the OECD countries
in the support for income equality, both in the aggregate as well as across income classes. For
example, Portugal and Turkey have the strongest support for income equality among the OECD
countries, with roughly two thirds of the population in favor of it. However, the distribution of
10For example, their calculation indicates that, over a ve year period, those in the lowest income decile have about
92 percent chance of staying below the median income. Similarly, those in the highest income decile have about 94
percent chance of remaining above the median income. In other words, there appears to be a lot of inertia in the
tails of the income distribution. On the other hand, those in the fth income decile have about 41 percent chance of
rising above the median income.
9support for more income equality is dierent even for these two countries; relatively more people
in the lower income class in Portugal support income equality than Turkey. On the other hand,
the United States has the lowest support for more income equality: less than one third of the
population support it.
Figure 4 in the appendix depicts the distribution of preference for income equality across the
original income categories for each country in the World Values Survey. Consistent with the
nding from the General Social Survey, the distributions of the preferences for income equality
are smoother than pocketbook voting would imply.11 In short, the evidence thus far suggests that
there are deviations from pocketbook voting at the individual level in a fairly large cross-section
of countries. Nonetheless, a cursory examination of Table 2 also suggests that at the aggregate
level, there appears to be greater preference for more income equality over private incentives in
countries that are relatively more equal, such as Sweden and Finland, and vice versa. Could it
be that despite deviations from pocketbook voting at the individual level, pocketbook voting still
provides a good approximation at the aggregate level? This is the question I turn to next.
3.2 Logistic Regression and Post Regression Accounting of International Pref-
erence for Income Equality
Table 3 presents the logistic regression of the international preference for income equality, using
data from the World Values Survey. The dependent variable is EQUALDUM, which equals one for
preference for more income equality, and zero for preference for greater private incentive. Income
status is indeed statistically signicant. There are two income variables, i.e., the lower income
dummy and the upper income dummy. In particular, population in the lower one third of the
11Admittedly, measurement of income in terms of household rather than personal income in the World Values
Survey could have contributed to the smoothness too, due to dierences in household size. However, the nding from
the General Social Survey is exempted from this criticism as income refers to personal income there.
10income distribution tend to support more equality, while those in the upper one third tend to
oppose it. In terms of personal characteristics, age, marital status, and the number of children in
the household have no signicant eect on preferences. Women feel more strongly about income
equality than men. This is not surprising since women have historically been treated unequally
from men. Education status has a statistically signicantly negative eect on preference for income
equality, even after controlling for income status. Educ12 is a dummy which equals one if the
respondent nishes education between thirteen and eighteen years of age. Similarly, Educ14 equals
one if the respondent completes education at nineteen years of age or above.
Employment status also enters signicantly. Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) argue that the
self-employed tend to have lower risk aversion, and this leads them to place lower value on the
social insurance provided by inequality reduction. Given the choice between more income equality
and greater private incentives, the self-employed do tend to favor more private incentive. The
unemployed and the retired tend to prefer more income equality over greater private incentives,
although the latter is not statistically signicant.
More importantly, other factors still enter signicantly, even after controlling for income and
employment status. First, consistent with the ndings in Alesina and Ferrara (2001) and Corneo
and Gr¨ uner (2000), perceived social mobility and its fairness have a signicant eect as well. People
who feel that hardwork usually brings a better life, and those who feel greater control in the way
life turns out tend to prefer greater individual incentives over more income equality.
Finally, almost all the country specic constants are still statistically signicant, even after con-
trolling for all the above determinants. The benchmark country is the United Status. It turns out
that relative to the United States, six of the former socialist economies { Poland, Czech Republic,
Estonia, China, East Germany, and Lithuania { have signicantly less preference for income equal-
ity, three { Slovenia, Hungary, Romania { have signicantly more preference for income equality,
11and three { Russia, Latvia, and Bulgaria { have preferences which are not statistically dierent.12
Nevertheless, the crucial question is not whether the relationships between income, inequality,
and the preference for income equality are statistically signicant, but whether they are quantita-
tively large. The important question is whether a suciently large number of individuals deviate
from pocketbook voting, so that models based on this assumption tend to lead to inaccurate pre-
dictions. It is whether income is an important determinant of the preference for income equality.
It is whether existing inequality explains sucient amount of variations in the support for more
income equality across jurisdictions with the power to redistribute.
To determine the relative importance of each determinant in explaining the observed interna-
tional dierences in preference between income equality and economic eciency, we follow Corneo
and Gr¨ uner's (2000) post-regression accounting methodology. The contribution of the ith determi-
nant in explaining the average dierence in preference between country j and the United States is
given by ^ i( x
j
i −  xUS
i ), where  x
j
i is the average value of the ith determinant in country j,a n d^ i is
the marginal eect of a change in the ith regressor on the probability that EQUALDUM equals
one.13 The United States is the benchmark country to which all comparisons are made. This
measure provides a linear approximation of the contribution of an exogenous variable in explaining
the average cross-country dierence in preferences. The results from the post accounting exercise
are reported in Table 4.
The results show that income variables only explain a tiny fraction of the cross-country dier-
ences in preferences for income equality. Moreover, quantitatively large and statistically signicant
12The country-eect in favor of more income equality is the strongest in Portugal, followed by Spain, Turkey, France,
South Korea, South Africa, Austria, India, Slovenia, Chile, Hungary, Japan, Romania, Norway, Mexico, Belgium,
West Germany, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland, Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada,
the United States, Britain, Latvia, Russia, Nigeria, Lithuania, East Germany, China, Estonia, Czech Republic, and
Poland.
13The marginal eect is calculated as the product of the coecient estimate on the i
th determinant in the logistic
regression and the density function of the error term evaluated at the means of the entire sample, with all country
specic constants set to zero. Mathematically, ^ i = ( 
0 x)(1 − (
0 x))i,w h e r e ( :) is the logistic cumulative
distribution function, and i the coecient estimate of determinant i.
12country eects remain even after taking into account dierences in personal and household char-
acteristics, income status, education status, and perceived social mobility. Thus, this conrms the
ndings in Corneo and Gr¨ uner (2000) for a larger cross-section of countries.
3.3 Median Preference for Income Equality and Existing Inequality
I have shown that people do indeed deviate signicantly from pocketbook voting. Moreover, the
large country eects found in the previous section suggest that countries do dier signicantly in
their degree of deviations from pocketbook voting. As a result, higher inequality need not lead
to higher tax rates across jurisdictions with the power to redistribute, as posited by Persson and
Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Assuming that the Median Voter Theorem still
applies, the median voter in the income distribution would no longer hold the median preference
for income equality because of these deviations; one's income position would no longer determine
his preference for redistribution. To investigate whether existing inequality is still an important
determinant of the median preference for income equality at the aggregate level, the median pref-
erence for income equality is directly identied from the distribution of the variable EQUAL for
each country.14
Figure 2 plots the median preference for more income equality versus the Gini coecient. There
appears to be a weak correlation between the median preference and the Gini coecient; they have
a pairwise correlation coecient of 0.30, which is not statistically signicant at the ve percent
level. South Africa appears to be an outlier in the upper right hand corner. Excluding South
Africa, the pairwise correlation coecient becomes 0.12, which is again not statistically signicant
at conventional levels.
14Recall that the variable EQUAL is dened such that a score in the range 6 { 10 indicates preference for more
income equality over greater private incentives, whereas a score in the range 1 { 5 means preference for greater private
incentives over more income equality. Thus a higher score indicates a stronger preference for more income equality.
13An ordered logit model is run with the median preference for income equality as the depen-
dent variable to determine if existing inequality level has any signicant eect on the intensity
of preference for greater income equality.15 The independent variables include the usual controls,
i.e., the logarithm of income per worker and average years of schooling. In addition, the growth
rate of GDP per worker during the past ve years is included to see if recent growth performance
changes societal choice between equality and eciency. A democracy dummy is included to inves-
tigate whether redistritive pressure is greater under democratic regimes. The democracy dummy
indicates the most democratic countries; it equals one for countries that receive a score of one for
political rights in Freedom House's Freedom in the World Survey. Finally, the Gini coecient is
included to measure existing inequality level.16 All the variables are measured in 1990. No separate
control for the former Socialist countries is included, as I believe that any systematic dierences
between former Socialist and non-Socialist countries should have been captured by the controls
already included.
The results are reported in column 1 in Table 5. The results show that richer countries tend
to have a higher median preference for income equality, while countries with higher educational
attainment tend to have a lower median preference. Both eects are statistically signicant at
the ve percent level. Recent economic growth is associated with stronger preference for income
equality, but the eect is not statistically signicant. There is no evidence that redistributive
pressure is stronger under democratic regimes. Finally, existing inequality is virtually unrelated to
the median preference.
Certainly, given the fact that voter turnout at elections is typically rather low, the relevant
15In an ordered logit regression, the probability of observing the preference indicator equals j for the i
th observation
is Pr(EQUALi = j)=Pr(kj−1 <
0xi + ui  kj), where where EQUALi is the preference indicator for the i
th
observation, xi is a column vector of the determinants of preferences, and ui is assumed to be logistically distributed.
Higher preference indicator j indicates stronger preference.
16The data for income per worker come from Penn World Table 5.6. Education data come from Barro and Lee
(1993). Data on inequality come from Deiniger and Squire (1996).
14median voter may not be the median agent from the entire population, but the median agent
among those who actually show up to vote. If people do not randomly decide whether to vote in
an election, then the median voter may be systematically dierent from the median agent in the
population. Since the probability of being the pivotal voter in any election is trivially small, it
is likely that noneconomic factors, such as values and identity, have important inﬂuences on the
propensity to vote. I assume that people do dier in their propensity to vote and ask if the median
preference among the voters is dierent from the median preference of the general population.
Unfortunately, the World Values Survey does not ask if the respondent voted in the past election.
However, it does ask the respondent how interested he is in politics. It is reasonable to assume
that those who either answer they \do not know" or are \not at all interested" are unlikely to
vote in an election. Thus our rst denition of voters consists of those who say that they are
either \very interested," \somewhat interested," or \not very interested" in politics. Our second
denition drops the group that are \not very interested" in politics as well. The resulting median
voter is identied for each case and their preferences are reported in Table 6.
It turns out that the median preference of the voters is not signicantly dierent from the
median preference of the general population. The ordered logit model is re-estimated using the
median preference under alternative denitions of the voters. The results are reported in columns
(2) and (3) in Table 5. Evidently, the qualitative results from before remain unchanged, although
only average schooling remains statistically signicant.
Since South Africa appears to be an outlier in Figure 2, it is omitted from the estimation as
a robustness check. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 5. Recent economic growth is
now statistically signicant. The Gini coecient has virtually no eect on the median preference.
In conclusion, both pairwise and partial correlations between existing inequality and the median
preference for income equality are negligible and highly insignicant at the aggregate level. Since
15higher existing inequality is not associated with stronger preference for income equality, the evidence
does not support models which posit redistributive distortions as channels through which inequality
hurts growth, such as the political economy models by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina
and Rodrik (1994).
3.4 Inequality and Polarization of Preferences
Although income inequality is not signicantly correlated with redistribution pressure, higher in-
equality can still be harmful if it leads to more polarized preferences in the society and makes
distributional conﬂicts more likely. If that happens, more resources will have to be set aside for
conﬂict resolution. To investigate this possibility, I use the inter-quartile range of the preferences
for income equality to measure the extent to which preferences are polarized. Figure 3 shows the
simple correlation between the inter-quartile range of preferences versus the Gini coecient. A pos-
itive association is clearly discernable. An ordered logit model is estimated with the inter-quartile
range of preference as the dependent variable, and the same set of right hand side variables as
before. Table 7 reports the results.
Most of the coecients are not statistically signicant. However, there is some evidence that
preferences are less polarized under democracy and in more educated societies. This may be
because democracy and education lead to better conﬂict resolution. The Gini coecient is positively
correlated with the dispersion of preferences. However, the eect is not statistically signicant. In
short, there is no strong evidence that higher inequality is associated with greater distributional
conﬂict.
164 Conclusions
A few stylized facts emerge from the analyses of the preference for income equality in the General
Social Survey and the World Values Survey. First, there are signicant deviations from pocketbook
voting. In particular, even among those who will undoubtedly gain from a more equal income
distribution, a signicant number of them do not prefer government redistribution; similarly, even
among those who will undoubtedly lose from a more equal income distribution, a signicant number
of them tend to favor some government redistribution. However, on average, proportionally more
poor prefer greater income equality than the rich. Second, a large fraction of the cross-country
dierences in the preference for income equality cannot be explained by dierences in income
status, educational status, social mobility, and perceived fairness of the mobility process. Large
country specic eects remain. There is no evidence that distributive pressure is more intense
under democratic regimes. Third, most former socialist countries have lower preference for more
income equality. Finally, there is no evidence that higher inequality is associated with stronger
median preferences for income equality. Thus, the evidence does not support the political economy
models on inequality and growth proposed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini
(1994), as their mechanisms work through redistributive pressures due to pocketbook voting.
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185 Data Appendix
5.1 Data from the World Values Survey
EQUAL: Variable ranging from one to ten, where `1' indicates that \there should be greater incen-
tives for individual eort", and `10' indicates that \incomes should be made more equal" (recoded
from V250).
EQUALDUM: Dummy variable that indicates preference for more income equality over private
incentives. It equals one if 6  EQUAL  10.
AGE: The age of the respondent (V355).
FEMALE: Dummy variable which equals one if respondent is female (Recoded from V353).
MARRIED: Dummy variable which equals one if respondent is married (Recoded from V181).
NCHILD: Number of children the respondent has had (Recoded from V211).
EDUC12: Dummy variable which equals one if the respondent completed education between 13 to
18 years of age. For East and West Germany, it equals one if the respondent completed education
between 15 to 18 years of age. For Turkey, it equals one if the respondent completed education
between 14 and 17 years of age (all the above are recoded from V356, which reports school leaving
age). For South Korea, it equals one if the respondent completed middle school and high school
(recoded from V375).
EDUC14: Dummy variable which equals one if the respondent completes education at 19 years of
age or above (recoded from V356). For Turkey, it equals one if the respondent completed education
between 18 and 21 years of age (all the above are recoded from V356, which reports school leaving
age). For South Korea, it equals one if the respondent completed two or four years of college, or
graduate school (recoded from V375).
19LOWER INCOME: Dummy variable which equals one if the respondent belongs to the lower one
third of the population (recoded from V363).
UPPER INCOME: Dummy variable which equals one if the respondent belongs to the lower one
third of the population (recoded from V363). V363 reports the income of the respondent's house-
hold, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes, before taxes and other deductions.
Responses have been classied into categories 1 to 10, from low to high. The exact classication
depends on the country. The exact classication is unknown for some countries.
SELF-EMPLOYED: Dummy variable which equals one for the self-employed (recoded from V358).
UNEMPLOYED: Dummy variable which equals one for the unemployed (recoded from V358).
RETIRED: Dummy variable which equals one for the retired (recoded from V358).
HARD WORK PAYS: Variable which ranges from one to ten, where `1' indicates that \hard work
doesn't generally bring success { it's more a matter of luck and connections", and `10' indicates
that \in the long run, hard work usually brings a better life" (recoded from V255).
CONTROL OVER LIFE: Ordered variable which ranges from one to ten, where `1' indicates that
the respondent feels that he has no freedom of choice and no control over the way his life turns
out, while `10' indicates a great deal of freedom of choice and control (V95).
COUNTRY SPECIFIC CONSTANTS: Dummy variables which equal one for the respective coun-
tries. The list includes: Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, East Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, India,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and West Germany.
POLITICS: Categorical variable which measures the respondent's level of interest in politics. `1'
20indicates very interested, `2' somewhat interested, `3' not very interested, `4' not at all interested,
and `9' don't know. It is assumed that agents who gives responses 4 and 9 are nonvoters (V241).
WEIGHT: Weight variable in the World Values Survey. It is intended to compensate for over-
or under-sampling of certain social groups, and to correct for various deviations from national
population parameters. It has been used in all of the empirical analyses using data from the World
Values Survey (V376).
5.2 Data from the General Social Survey
EQWLTH and EQWLTHY: Categorical variable which ranges between 1 to 7. Think of a score of
`1' as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income dierences between rich and poor,
\perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor", and a
score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income dierences.
We dene EQUAL = 8 - EQWLTH or 8-E Q W L T Has the intensity of preference for income
equality. We further dene EQUALDUM as a dummy which equals one if EQWLTHY  3o r
EQWLTHY  3.
RINCOME: Income of the respondent in income classes.
FORMWT: Weight variable in the General Social Survey.
5.3 Other Sources of Data
U.S. data on median and mean personal income in current dollars come from the website of the
Census Department.
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/p04.html
21Table 1: Support for Redistribution By Income Classes in the United States in 1978
Preference for Redistribution, EQUAL (%) Cumulative Income
I n c o m e C a t e g o r y 1234567 D i s t r i b u t i o n a (%)
 $1000 8.0 12.1 12.4 19.0 17.1 5.8 25.6 7.2
$1000 { 2999 8.6 7.1 14.0 22.1 21.3 3.2 23.6 20.5
$3000 { 3999 8.8 4.6 11.1 28.2 10.2 7.6 29.3 25.6
$4000 { 4999 9.8 4.8 9.6 24.3 25.8 13.6 12.2 31.4
$5000 { 5999 17.8 2.7 9.8 27.3 20.0 8.6 13.9 36.7
$6000 { 6999 6.4 6.9 7.9 37.3 14.0 9.0 18.5 41.0
$7000 { 7999 25.2 6.3 9.5 6.0 20.3 7.8 24.9 45.4
$8000 { 9999 15.9 4.0 14.8 18.4 16.9 10.3 19.7 53.8
$10000 { 14999 13.0 8.1 13.4 16.9 20.2 13.0 15.4 72.8
$15000 { 19999 19.2 8.1 21.2 16.5 11.8 12.4 10.9 85.8
$20000 { 24999 16.2 17.3 8.4 27.5 19.6 6.2 4.8 92.9
 $25000 23.3 27.0 11.7 6.0 11.0 18.6 2.5 100.0
Total 14.2 9.1 13.1 19.8 17.6 9.9 16.3 {
Note: Sample Size = 926. Average Income in 1978 = $9451. `1': Government should not concern itself with reducing
income dierences. `7': Government ought to reduce income dierences between rich and poor.
a The cumulative income distribution refers to the percentage of people who belong to that income category or below.
Source: General Social Survey.
22Table 2: Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer Income Equality By Income Classes for OECD
countries
% Prefer Income Equality (EQUALDUM =1 )
Country Lower Income Middle Income Upper Income All Income
Austria 64.9 47.6 44.6 51.7
(2.4) (2.1) (2.4) (1.3)
Belgium 48.8 46.6 30.8 43.3
(2.4) (2.5) (2.8) (1.5)
Britain 39.5 26.5 22.1 30.2
(2.6) (2.8) (2.6) (1.6)
Canada 36.3 31.3 20.9 29.4
(2.5) (1.9) (1.9) (1.2)
Denmark 38.7 37.7 29.9 36.0
(2.6) (2.8) (3.0) (1.6)
Finland 41.8 38.8 15.6 32.2
(3.9) (3.2) (2.7) (2.0)
France 67.1 56.1 41.6 56.3
(2.6) (3.1) (3.2) (1.7)
Germany, West 49.1 40.1 33.3 40.7
(2.0) (2.0) (1.8) (1.1)
Ireland 48.7 36.0 23.4 35.1
(3.1) (2.8) (2.3) (1.6)
Italy 47.7 35.2 19.5 39.5
(2.4) (2.8) (4.3) (1.7)
Japan 55.4 45.7 33.1 43.8
(3.6) (2.9) (2.9) (1.8)
Netherlands 49.5 34.2 23.6 36.0
(3.3) (3.6) (3.3) (2.0)
Norway 50.3 41.7 28.9 40.4
(2.9) (2.4) (2.6) (1.5)
Portugal 79.2 68.3 52.5 64.8
(2.7) (2.8) (3.1) (1.8)
Spain 69.4 60.3 49.5 60.6
(1.6) (1.5) (1.7) (0.9)
Sweden 23.7 42.2 35.9 32.5
(2.1) (2.9) (3.2) (1.6)
Turkey 70.9 63.8 59.4 64.8
(2.5) (2.5) (2.8) (1.5)
USA 34.3 27.1 25.7 28.9
(2.1) (1.9) (2.0) (1.2)
Note: Standard errors of the percentage estimates are in parentheses.
Source: World Values Survey.
23Table 3: International Preference for More Income Equality (Logit)
Regressor Estimate Regressor Estimate Regressor Estimate
Age 0.00 Britain -0.1 Lithuania -0.43
(0.00) (0.11) (0.12)**
Female 0.21 Bulgaria 0.05 Mexico 0.53
(0.03)** (0.11) (0.10)**
No. of Children 0.03 Canada 0.00 Netherlands 0.13
(0.01) (0.1) (0.14)
Married -0.04 Chile 0.71 Nigeria -0.4
(0.04) (0.09)** (0.20)*
Educ12 -0.25 China -0.67 Norway 0.55
(0.05)** (0.15)** (0.10)**
Educ14 -0.62 Czech -0.84 Poland -0.85
(0.06)** (0.11)** (0.13)**
Lower Income 0.3 Denmark 0.33 Portugal 1.45
(0.04)** (0.11)** (0.12)**
Upper Income -0.35 East Germany -0.5 Romania 0.55
(0.04)** (0.10)** (0.10)**
Self-Employed -0.15 Estonia -0.79 Russia -0.16
(0.06)* (0.13)** (0.1)
Unemployed 0.26 Finland 0.25 Slovenia 0.74
(0.08)** (0.13)* (0.10)**
Retired 0.1 France 1.08 South Africa 0.91
(0.05) (0.11)** (0.09)**
Hard Work Pays -0.02 Hungary 0.64 South Korea 1.01
(0.01)** (0.10)** (0.10)**
Control over Life -0.06 India 0.79 Spain 1.22
(0.01)** (0.13)** (0.08)**
Argentina 0.07 Ireland 0.09 Sweden 0.13
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Austria 0.88 Italy 0.21 Turkey 1.2
(0.09)** (0.12) (0.12)**
Belgium 0.53 Japan 0.6 West Germany 0.45
(0.10)** (0.11)** (0.09)**
Brazil 0.35 Latvia -0.12 Constant -0.04
(0.10)** (0.13) (0.13)
Note: N = 32,124. Robust standard errors of the percentage are in parentheses. *Signicantly dierent from zero at
the ve percent level. **Signicantly dierent from zero at the one percent level.
24Table 4: Post Regression Accounting
Percent Prefer Percent Personal Educational Income Employment Social Country
Country Income Equality Explained Characteristics Attainment Status Status Mobility Eect
Argentina 3.9 4 0.1 1.9 0.2 -0.7 0.9 1.5
Austria 22.8 23.8 0.1 0.6 0.2 -0.3 2.2 21
Belgium 14.4 15.2 -0.2 0.6 0.7 0 2 12.1
Brazil 17.5 16.9 0.6 6.9 0.4 -0.4 1.8 7.7
Britain 1.1 2.2 -0.2 1.7 1.5 -0.1 1.4 -2.1
Bulgaria 3.6 3.9 -0.4 -0.1 0.6 -0.2 2.9 1.1
Canada -0.6 -0.8 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 -0.1
Chile 18.1 19 0.5 0.9 0.6 -0.6 1 16.6
China -9.6 -11.8 -0.7 0.4 0.6 -1.1 1 -12.1
Czech -12.3 -12 0 0.2 0.3 -0.3 2.2 -14.5
Denmark 7.1 7.8 -0.2 -1.9 0.6 0 2 7.3
East Germany -8.1 -8.2 -0.1 1 -0.7 -0.1 1.1 -9.4
Estonia -12.6 -12.8 0.1 -2.1 1.4 -0.3 1.8 -13.8
Finland 2.2 2.9 -0.1 -1.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.2 5.6
France 28.3 29.4 0.1 0.8 0.5 0 2 25.9
Hungary 16.8 17.5 -0.4 1.9 -0.9 0.2 1.7 15
India 28.6 18.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 1.3 18.7
Ireland 4.4 4.7 0.4 1.9 -0.4 -0.3 1.1 2
Italy 12.7 14.6 -0.5 5.3 3.2 -0.2 2.3 4.5
Japan 13.3 14.4 -0.4 0.1 -1.1 -0.9 2.9 13.9
Latvia -4.4 -4.4 0 -2.9 -0.9 -0.4 2.2 -2.4
Lithuania -6.4 -6.3 -0.2 -1.4 1.7 -0.2 2.1 -8.3
Mexico 17.9 18 0.3 4 1.7 -0.9 0.7 12.1
Netherlands 3.6 4.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 2.6 2.8
Nigeria -4.8 -8.3 0.7 -2.3 0.7 -0.9 1.3 -7.7
Norway 10 11.3 -0.4 -1.4 -0.7 -0.2 1.1 12.8
Poland -12.1 -11.8 -0.1 0.5 0.6 -0.5 2.4 -14.7
Portugal 39.8 42.2 -0.1 5.3 0.5 -0.3 2.2 34.7
Romania 12.6 13.5 -0.4 0.6 -0.5 -0.4 1.6 12.6
Russia -1.5 -1.7 -0.1 -0.9 0.8 -0.2 1.9 -3.2
Slovenia 19.4 20.2 -0.1 -0.3 1.6 0.1 1.7 17.3
South Africa 27.9 24 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.2 21.6
South Korea 22.7 24.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.6 0.2 24.1
Spain 33.8 34.2 0 3.4 0.2 -0.3 1.7 29.3
Sweden 2.3 3 -0.3 -1.6 1.5 -0.1 0.8 2.7
Turkey 38 38.8 0.4 6.2 0.4 -0.6 3.8 28.7
West Germany 11.6 12.1 -0.4 1.5 -0.3 0 1.1 10.1
2
5Table 5: Median Preference For Income Equality and Macroeconomic Environment { Ordered Logit
by MLE
Entire Voting Voting
Population Population I Population II
(1) (2) (3)
A. All Available Observations
Growth During Past Five Years 0.48 0.46 0.42
(0.25) (0.25) (0.22)
ln (Income per Worker) 2.07 1.74 2.32
(1.03)* (1.13) (1.65)
Average Years of Schooling -0.92 -0.81 -0.81
(0.28)** (0.27)** (0.25)**
Democracy Dummy -1.33 -0.69 -1.31
(1.45) (1.58) (1.68)
Gini Coecient 0.00 0.04 0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
N3 0 3 0 3 0
B. Outlier South Africa Omitted
Growth During Past Five Years 0.74 0.62 0.56
(0.32)* (0.25)* (0.22)*
ln (Income per Worker) 2.22 1.87 2.41
(1.14) (1.18) (1.69)
Average Years of Schooling -1.18 -0.96 -0.92
(0.32)** (0.29)** (0.27)**
Democracy Dummy -0.87 -0.64 -1.18
(1.86) (1.69) (1.71)
Gini Coecient -0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
N2 9 2 9 2 9
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *Signicant at 5%. **Signicant at 1%.
26Table 6: Gini Coecient and Median Preference for Income Equality
Median Preference
Gini Entire Voting Voting Interquartile
Country Code Coe. Pop. Pop. I Pop. II Preference
Argentina ARG 47.6 3 3 3 5
Austria AUT 28.9 6 5 5 5
Belgium BEL 26.6 4 4 4 5
Bulgaria BGR 24.5 4 3 3 4
Brazil BRA 59.6 5 5 5 6
Canada CAN 27.6 3 3 3 4
Chile CHL 57.9 5 5 5 6
China CHN 34.6 3 3 2 3
Czech CSK 24.6 3 3 3 3
West Germany DEU 26.0 4 4 4 4
Denmark DNK 33.2 4 4 4 3
Spain ESP 25.9 6 6 6 4
Finland FIN 26.1 4 4 4 4
France FRA 34.9 6 6 6 5
Britain GBR 32.3 4 4 4 3
Hungary HUN 23.3 5 4 4 5
India IND 29.7 6 6 6 6
Ireland IRL 34.6 4 4 4 5
Italy ITA 32.7 4 4 4 4
Japan JPN 35.0 5 5 5 2
South Korea KOR 33.6 6 6 6 6
Mexico MEX 55.0 4 4 4 6
Nigeria NGA 41.2 2 2 3 4
Netherlands NLD 29.6 4 4 4 3
Norway NOR 33.3 5 5 5 3
Poland POL 26.2 2 2 2 3
Portugal PRT 36.8 7 6 6 4
Romania ROM 25.5 4 3 3 5
Sweden SWE 32.5 4 4 4 3
Turkey TUR 44.1 7 7 7 7
United States USA 37.8 4 4 4 4
South Africa ZAF 62.3 8 8 7 7
Notes: The preference for income equality has a scale from one to ten, where `1' indicates preference that \there
should be greater incentives for individual eort," and `10' indicates preference that \incomes should be made more
equal." In other words, higher score indicates stronger preference for income equality.
27Table 7: Divergence of Preferences For Income Equality and Macroeconomic Environment { Or-
dered Logit by MLE
Entire Voting Voting
Population Population I Population II
Growth During Past Five Years 0.11 0.18 0.20
(0.19) (0.24) (0.20)
ln (Income per Worker) 2.37 2.06 3.01
(1.31) (1.34) (1.67)
Average Years of Schooling -0.57 -0.52 -0.49
(0.22)* (0.30) (0.32)
Democracy Dummy -4.24 -3.18 -3.80
(1.68)* (1.86) (2.10)
Gini Coecient 0.09 0.06 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
N3 0 3 0 3 0
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *Signicant at 5%. **Signicant at 1%.
28Figure 1: Support for Redistribution by Income Classes in the U.S. in 1978
Source: General Social Survey.
Figure 2: Simple Correlation Between the Median Preference for Income Equality and the Gini
Coecient
29Figure 3: Simple Correlation Between the Inter-quartile Range of Preferences for More Income
Equality and the Gini Coecient
30Figure 4: Support for Redistribution by Income Classes for All Countries in the World Values
Survey in 1990
3132Source: World Values Survey.
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